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ABSTRACT
Objective: To assess the preparedness of the US mass fatality infrastructure, we developed and tested
metrics for 3 components of preparedness: organizational, operational, and resource sharing networks.
Methods: In 2014, data were collected from 5 response sectors: medical examiners and coroners, the
death care industry, health departments, faith-based organizations, and offices of emergency
management. Scores were calculated within and across sectors and a weighted score was developed
for the infrastructure.
Results: A total of 879 respondents reported highly variable organizational capabilities: 15% had
responded to a mass fatality incident (MFI); 42% reported staff trained for an MFI, but only 27% for an
MFI involving hazardous contaminants. Respondents estimated that 75% of their staff would be willing
and able to respond, but only 53% if contaminants were involved. Most perceived their organization as
somewhat prepared, but 13% indicated “not at all.” Operational capability scores ranged from 33%
(death care industry) to 77% (offices of emergency management). Network capability analysis found
that only 42% of possible reciprocal relationships between resource-sharing partners were present. The
cross-sector composite score was 51%; that is, half the key capabilities for preparedness were in place.
Conclusions: The sectors in the US mass fatality infrastructure report suboptimal capability to respond.
National leadership is needed to ensure sector-specific and infrastructure-wide preparedness for a
large-scale MFI. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;0:1-11)
Key Words: mass fatalities, network analysis, disaster, emergency preparedness, epidemiologic methods,
hazardous substances, health policy
Two of the most enduring American values arerespect for the deceased and compassion forthe bereaved. Even in the aftermath of a mass
fatality incident (MFI), we strive to uphold these
values through rapid identification of decedents, the
provision of spiritual and psychological support to
families and responders, and timely release of remains
for final interment. However, management of a large-
scale or complex MFI is extremely challenging and
requires the cooperation and collaboration of a large
network of public and private agencies and organiza-
tions. In the United States, this is referred to as the
mass fatality infrastructure. The sectors that constitute
this infrastructure, as shown in Figure 1, include
the medico-legal system of medical examiners and
coroners (ME/C), the death care industry (DCI;
funeral homes, cemeteries, crematories, and funeral
industry suppliers), departments of health (DOHs),
faith-based organizations (FBOs) and other voluntary
organizations, offices of emergency management
(OEMs), and the Disaster Mortuary Operational
Response Teams (DMORTs).
Cooperation between sectors is essential but difficult for
a number of reasons; each sector has different but
interdependent responsibilities and must be cognizant of
the roles that other sectors play, each has varying levels
of capabilities, and each operates at different levels. For
example, the medico-legal system and the DOHs
operate at the county, regional, or state level, and
members of both the DCI and FBOs may be local
(eg, local funeral homes, community faith-based orga-
nization) or national (eg, nationwide funeral industry
services). The DMORTs, which are organized by Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions,
respond under the command of the US Department of
Health and Human Services and the control of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.
Although each sector plays an essential independent
role, ultimately, the successful management of a large-
scale or complex MFI is dependent on an effective and
cooperative response from all infrastructure members.
An MFI is defined by convention as a situation in
which the number of deaths exceeds the local
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jurisdiction’s response capabilities. A large-scale MFI may
involve hundreds of fatalities. A complex MFI refers to
contamination of the site or remains with chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE)
contaminants. During an MFI, it is first the local authorities,
most often the ME/C, that are responsible for managing
additional deaths above those expected during normal
operations. When demand exceeds capacity, additional
resources may be provided, typically by county and state
OEMs and DOHs.1-3 Collaboration with nongovernmental
partners such as funeral homes, churches, and voluntary
organizations such as the American Red Cross also occurs.2,4
When local capabilities are exceeded, the plan in the United
States is to call upon state and then federal resources, such as
the DMORTs.5
Nearly a decade ago, amid growing concerns of deliberate
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction and fears
of a high-fatality pandemic event, a Working Group was
convened by the US Northern Command in cooperation
with the US Department of Health and Human Services to
discuss the nation’s ability to effectively manage an MFI.6
The Working Group concluded that the capabilities of
the US mass fatality management infrastructure were
limited, especially with respect to large-scale catastrophic
events, and they recommended that additional preparedness
steps be taken immediately to improve readiness. However,
improvements have lagged; as noted in the National
Preparedness Report,7 states and territories consistently rank
themselves poorly prepared in the area of fatality manage-
ment, which is 1 of the 31 core capabilities defined in the
National Preparedness Goals.5 Disaster preparedness experts
both within and external to the infrastructure
consistently voice concerns regarding large-scale MFI
preparedness in the United States.
An important barrier to improvement has been the lack of
consensus on the appropriate measures of preparedness for
each of the key sectors in the MFI infrastructure. This study
was designed to address this gap by (1) developing and testing
new sector-specific metrics of preparedness and (2) using
these metrics to assess preparedness for each sector and for the
infrastructure as a whole.
METHODS
Metric and Survey Development
With input from stakeholders in each response sector and
experts in mass fatality management and disaster response, we
first identified 3 key components or domains to “define”
preparedness: (1) organizational capabilities, (2) operational
capabilities, and (3) strength of reciprocal ties with resource-
sharing partners.
To construct sector-specific items for each component, we
followed a 4-part process: (1) review of federal MFI response
documents and relevant analogous documents for each of
the sectors; (2) an environmental scan to obtain existing
FIGURE 1
US Mass Fatality Infrastructure.
Abbreviations: DHHS, US Department of Health and Human Services; OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
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materials for review, such as state annexes, mass fatality plans,
or other documents; (3) drafting of survey items based on
document review; and (4) iterative review by the research
team and external experts. Individualized surveys were then
constructed for each of the infrastructure sectors and
formatted for anonymous online administration.8 The surveys
underwent extensive validation testing before administration.
Our expert panel reviewed draft surveys and assessed them for
construct validity (including both face and content validity)
as well as criterion validity. We also conducted analysis of
measures to assess for convergent validity via pilot testing
with representative members of each sector. The pilot testing
also served to refine the internet-based survey format and to
determine the average length of time for completion. Each
survey contained about 50 items tailored to each sector and
took about 20 minutes to complete. At the start of each
survey, a brief introductory paragraph provided information
on the purpose of the study and information on the
research team members. No incentives were used because
all participants were professional representatives of their
organizations. All procedures had the approval of the
University of California, San Francisco, and Columbia
University Institutional Review Boards (CHR 12-09425
and IRB-AAAL0206). All study materials, including the
surveys, may be obtained by contacting the corresponding
author.
Data Collection
Data were collected over a 6-week period. Respondents were
recruited through collaborating professional groups and
associations: the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials; the National Association of County and City
Health Officials; the National Association of Medical
Examiners; the International Association of Coroners and
Medical Examiners; the International Cemetery, Cremation
and Funeral Association; the National Funeral Directors
Association; the International Association of Emergency
Managers; and the National Disaster Interfaiths Network.
DMORTs were contacted directly. Because a great many
voluntary organizations may respond to large-scale MFIs and
it was beyond the scope of this study to include them all, we
decided to focus on FBOs because they have increasingly
been playing a more prominent role in response to MFIs.
Other voluntary organizations, such as the American Red
Cross, were, however, included on the surveys as possible
response partners, along with local health organizations, first
responder agencies, and others. Potential participants were
recruited through the collaborating professional organizations
noted above. Announcements regarding the study were made
and a link to the survey was provided. Interested individuals
were requested to forward the link to the person in their
organization most knowledgeable about planning for MFIs.
For that reason, and also because most of these organizations
have fluid memberships, it is not possible to ascertain an
accurate denominator.
Measures
To assess organizational capacity to respond to MFIs, 5 survey
questions called for yes or no answers: whether the respon-
dent’s jurisdiction experienced an MFI in the past 5 years,
whether their organization conducted or participated in
jurisdiction-wide (city, county, state) drills or exercises,
whether their organization had mutual aid agreements in
place to share resources with jurisdictional or community
partners, and whether their organization had provided
training to its staff on (a) the mass fatality plan and (b) MFIs
involving CBRNE. Additionally, respondents were asked to
estimate the percentage of staff expected to report during an
MFI on a scale from 0% to 100% in increments of 10%. The
question was asked 4 ways: percentage willing to respond to
MFI, percentage willing to respond to MFI involving
CBRNE, percentage able to respond to MFI, and percentage
able to respond to MFI involving CBRNE (this question was
not part of the survey for the OEM sector because they are
mandated to respond). Respondents were also asked to
indicate which of 7 elements (eg, more training, more drills,
more written plans) their organization needed to be better
prepared. Perception of organizational preparedness was
measured on a 5-point Likert scale by asking, “How would
you rate the overall preparedness of your agency, office or
organization?”
To assess operational capability to respond, each sector’s
survey contained a list of key elements or capabilities tailored
to the response role for that sector. Respondents were asked
to indicate whether or not an item was included in their
organization’s plan. The survey for the FBO sector did not
measure this capacity, because responders from the National
Disaster Interfaiths Network are not drawn from any single
organization.
To assess network capability for collaborative resource sharing
between MFI response partners, answers to 2 questions were
combined: (1) From which agencies or organizations does your
agency/office expect to obtain necessary resources to manage
MFI? and (2) To which agencies or organizations does your
agency/office expect to provide necessary resources to manage
MFI? Answers were dichotomous (yes or no). The DOH and
ME/C sectors were asked about relationships with 11 possible
response partners (eg, local first response organizations, local
health care organizations, state DOH). The OEM and DCI
sectors were asked about 9 and 6 possible partners, respectively.
The FBO sector is not expected to obtain resources from
response partners and therefore was only asked about providing
resources. Possible response partners at all levels (local, state,
and federal) were included. We did not differentiate between
“appropriate” and “possible” relationships (ie, state-level orga-
nizations would be expected to have relationships at the federal
level), for 2 reasons: (1) to standardize surveys across all sub-
groups, we used similar lists of all possible response partners, and
(2) to learn more about all possible partners—even unexpected
ones—because information on this is lacking. To estimate
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overall MFI preparedness, we devised a composite score that
combined the weighted averages of each sector’s organizational,
operational, and network capabilities.
Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics were performed. In all cases, missing data
and “don’t know” responses were dropped when calculating
point estimates. The average percentage of “don’t know” and
missing responses across questions in each of the surveys was
about 7% for DCI, 9% for DOH, 16% for FBO, 12% for
ME/C, and 10% for OEM. Data preparation and analysis were
performed by using R,9 and network analysis was performed
with ORA.10
To analyze items related to organizational and operational
capability, we computed the percentage answering “yes” in
the context of each item. The true proportion (ie, valid
percent) that responded positively were aggregated within
sectors and then averaged across sectors. For “perception of
workplace preparedness,” we computed the distribution across
categories (ie, 0% to 100%). For estimates of staff willing and
able to respond, we produced 2 scores: (1) mean percentage
estimated willing and able to respond in an MFI and
(2) mean percentage estimated willing and able to respond in
an MFI with CBRNE.
To analyze network capability, a matrix was created for the 2
resource-sharing questions. Survey respondents were repre-
sented on the vertical axis and possible response partners on
the horizontal. In each cell, a value of 1 was assigned to a
“yes” response and all other responses were assigned 0. For
each sector, the 2 matrices were added and binarized such
that a bi-directional tie (ie, expect to both provide and obtain
resources) was valued as 1 and all others as 0. This network of
reciprocal relationships for each sector, when multiplied by its
transpose, produced a matrix in which cells on the diagonal
axis contained counts of reciprocal ties with each possible
partner. These counts were divided by the valid number of
respondents who answered the question to yield the propor-
tion in each sector that reported reciprocal ties with a specific
response partners. Note that we did not perform individual
network analysis at both state and local levels because only
DOHs and ME/C have both local level and state departments
or offices.
Network density was calculated for each sector on the “provide
resources,” “obtain resources,” and reciprocal networks. This
measure of network cohesion represents the existing ties
between entities as a proportion of all ties that are possible.11
Density scores were normalized to fall between 0 and 1 to allow
comparison between the sectors. Averages weighted by the
valid number of respondents were calculated across sectors.
To estimate MFI preparedness for the overall response infra-
structure, we aggregated the responses for each capability.
For the item addressing “elements needed for better pre-
paredness,” we reversed the calculation so that respondents
indicating that their organization needed fewer of the 7 ele-
ments received a higher score (ie, “were better prepared”). We
used density of the reciprocal ties network as an estimate of
network capability.
RESULTS
There were a total of 879 US responses across 5 sectors
distributed across all FEMA regions. International responses
were excluded (and there were a few, mainly from Canadians).
There were 294 responses from representatives of the DCI
sector, 178 from DOHs, 124 from FBOs, 122 from ME/C, 161
from OEMs, and 5 from DMORTs. Because there were so few
DMORTs in the sample (there are only 10 in the United
States, although not all are currently active), and because they
are organized by FEMA region, the DMORT responses were
not included in the analysis presented here to protect their
privacy. Most states, territories, and the District of Columbia
were represented by at least one respondent from at least one
sector (Figure 2), and responses were obtained from all levels
(county, city, state, and federal). Responses were more
concentrated in the northeast, and Texas was over-represented
in the data.
Organizational Capability
Across the 5 sectors, 48% of respondents indicated that their
organization participated in jurisdiction-wide drills, as shown
in Table 1. The greatest proportion was from the ME/C sector
and the smallest was from the DCI sector.
Across sectors, only 15% indicated that their jurisdiction
experienced an MFI in the past 5 years. The FBO sector,
which responds nationally via the National Disaster Inter-
faiths Network,12 reported the greatest proportion. The
DCI sector reported the smallest. The most frequently
reported needs were for more training, planning, and drills.
About half of the respondents indicated a need for more
funding and greater surge capacity. The least frequently
reported needs were for written MFI plans and inter-agency
agreements.
Across sectors, respondents estimated that 75% of their
organizations’ staff would be “willing and able” to respond to
MFIs. The ME/C sector estimated the greatest percentages,
followed by DCI and DOH. The estimates from the
FBO sector were the smallest. The estimated proportion
“willing and able” decreased by about 20 percentage points if
the MFI involved CBRNE contamination, and this was
true across all sectors. Most respondents perceived their
organization to be prepared to some degree. Only 13%
indicated that their organization was “not at all prepared”
(Table 2).
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Operational Capability
The proportion of sector-specific capabilities that respondents
reported to be present in their organizations’ operational
plans ranged between 33% (DCI) and 77% (OEM). The
results are given in alphabetical order in Table 3.
DCI respondents reported 33% capability across 8 items.
A majority reported that their plans covered up-to-date
contact information for staff and suppliers (74%). Fewer
reported that their plans addressed the ability to repair critical
equipment (47%), included up-to-date contact information
FIGURE 2
Distribution of Sector Respondents, by State (N = 879).
TABLE 1
Organizational Capability to Respond in 3 Categoriesa
Valid Percent by Response Sector
Survey Item DCI DOH FBO MEC OEM Average
Respondent Count 294 178 124 122 161 -
a. Respondent’s organization has…
conducted/participated in jurisdiction-wide drills/exercises 28 51 53 81 54 48
experienced MFI in past 5 years 4 13 51 18 11 15
staff trained on MFI plan 19 28 56 74 b 42
staff trained on CBRNE 16 30 39 29 b 27
mutual aid agreements with jurisdiction/community partners 60 83 58 87 88 76
Average 25 41 51 58 51 40
b. To be better prepared respondent’s organization needs…
more interagency agreements with response partners 30 40 26 43 45 36
drills with other response partners 54 80 63 59 69 64
more funding for MFI 41 72 45 65 66 56
more MFI planning activities 69 75 56 60 69 67
greater surge capacity 43 66 31 66 53 51
staff training 66 83 76 75 69 73
a written MFI plan 71 31 45 13 30 43
Average 53 64 49 54 57 56
c. Respondent’s estimate for percent of staff…
willing and able to respond in MFI 80 71 53 84 b 75
willing and able to respond in MFI with CBRNE 53 57 34 66 b 53
Average 67 64 44 75 b 64
aAbbreviations: CBRNE, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives; DCI, death care industry; DOH, department of health; FBO, faith-based
organization; MEC, medical examiners/coroners; MFI, mass fatality incident; OEM, offices of emergency management.
bQuestion was not asked.
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for back-up staff (48%), or included written inventories
of key supplies (35%). Even fewer reported written plans
for maintaining regular service (16%), formal agreements
with suppliers (14%), written plans for staff absences (14%),
and written plans for provision of altered standards of
service (12%).
DOH respondents reported 72% capability across 19 items.
A majority, ranging between 97% and 51%, reported that
their operational MFI plans addressed 16 or more of the
19 capabilities. A minority reported that their plan addressed
3 items related to security of the disaster site and human
remains.
ME/C respondents reported an average of 52% capability
across 34 items. Over 70% reported that their MFI cap-
abilities included morgue services and management of human
remains, but the proportion dropped to below 60% for their
ability to carry out joint investigations and to maintain site
security. The lowest operational capability scores reported by
the ME/C were for providing long-term family management
and memorials (8%), identification of temporary interment
sites (17%), communicating via social media (21%), and
organizing a missing persons call center (23%). The ability to
provide interment that was sensitive to religious and cultural
considerations was low (30%).
OEM respondents reported 77% overall operational capability
(using 16 items in each of 3 distinct categories of MFI (“regular”
MFI, epidemic MFI, and hazardous materials [CBRNE] MFI)
that they might be required to respond to. For an MFI without
pandemic/epidemic or hazardous materials (CBRNE) involved,
an average 97% capability was reported. In contrast, OEM
respondents reported much lower capability for responding to
MFI with pandemic/epidemic (66%) and MFI contaminated
with CBRNE (69%). Items addressing management of sites
and human remains were the source of greatest discrepancy
between “regular” and contaminated response capability.
Network Capability
The proportion of respondents reporting reciprocal resource-
sharing relationships with possible response partners is shown
in Table 4. Across groups, respondents reported the lowest
rates of reciprocity with faith-based and other volunteer
organizations. Across sectors, there was considerable
variability. High proportions (60-70%) of ME/C respondents
reported reciprocity with local and state OEMs, local health
departments, and local first response organizations. High
proportions of DOH respondents (~60%) reported reciprocity
with the coroner/sheriff/justice of peace and local first
responders. OEM sector respondents reported the highest
reciprocal ties with local first responders (68%), coroners
(51%), and nearby health departments (50%). Most DCI
sector respondents did not report reciprocity with possible
partners, except for organizations “similar to their own”
(ie, other local funeral homes, cemeteries, and crematories),
for which 64% reported reciprocal relationships.
Of particular note, few OEM respondents (23%) reported
reciprocity with local funeral homes, cemeteries, and crema-
tories, and even fewer DCI respondents (9%) reported reci-
procity with the local OEM. An interesting reciprocity gap
was noted; more ME/C and DOH respondents reported
reciprocity with local funeral homes (59% and 55%, respec-
tively) than DCI sector respondents reported with ME/C and
DOH (27% and 10%, respectively).
Network density measurements are shown in Table 5. In the
“provide resources” network, 56% of possible relationships
were present. In the “obtain resources” network, 52% of
possible relationships were present. In the reciprocal network,
42% of possible relationships were present. The governmental
sectors (DOH, OEM, and ME/C) had the highest density
measurements, indicating greater potential for resource shar-
ing. The DCI sector had the lowest, with the notable
exception of the “provide resources” network, which was on
par with the governmental sectors.
A composite estimate of national MFI preparedness calcu-
lated from the weighted averages for each of the 3 compo-
nents of preparedness across the 5 response sectors was 51%.
This was based on within-sector estimates of overall pre-
paredness capability at 36% for the DCI sector, 55% for FBO,
50% for DOH, 53% for ME/C, and 63% for OEM.
DISCUSSION
In this study of a national sample of 879 individual repre-
sentatives of 5 MFI response sectors, preparedness capabilities
were uneven. The governmental sectors (DOH, ME/C, and
OEM) generally reported greater capability than the private
sectors (DCI and FBO), although important gaps were
reported in all sectors. A composite estimate across sectors
suggests the nation is about half prepared for a complex MFI,
mirroring federal estimates.5,7
TABLE 2
Distribution of Respondent’s Perception of Workplace
Preparednessa
Valid Percent by Response Sector
Survey Item DCI DOH FBO MEC OEM Average
Respondent count 294 178 124 122 161 -
1 = Not at all prepared 26 2 16 4 6 13
2 29 6 18 11 19 19
3 = Somewhat prepared 27 48 28 41 41 36
4 16 42 29 38 32 29
5 = Completely prepared 2 3 9 5 3 4
aAbbreviations: DCI, death care industry; DOH, department of health;
FBO, faith-based organization; MEC, medical examiners/coroners; OEM,
offices of emergency management.
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TABLE 3
Operational Capability to Respond: Elements Included in the Mass Fatality Incident Plan of the Respondents’ Organizationsa
Valid Percent by Response Sector
Survey Item DCI DOH MEC OEM Regular OEM Epidemic OEM Hazmatb
Ability to repair critical equipment without outside help 47 -c - - - -
Access to spiritual counseling - 58 - - - -
Additional refrigeration space - 58 - - - -
Antemortem data collections - - 61 - - -
Applicability and scope - - 61 - - -
Assumptions - - 45 - - -
Back-up emergency staff, up-to-date contact list 48 - - - - -
Command and control for fatality management - - 77 - - -
Communication information - - - 99 79 79
Communicating via social media - 71 21 100 81 80
Concept of operations - - 66 - - -
Continuity of operations - 94 60 - - -
Credential managing disaster personnel and volunteers - - 47 - - -
Custody of personal property, processing evidence - - - 97 50 59
Decedent manifest - - 49 - - -
Decedent release/final disposition - - 67 96 70 66
Decontamination of assets in and out of incident scene - - - 89 63 85
Disseminating public information - 98 38 - - -
Family assistance center - 54 66 99 66 59
Formal agreements with suppliers to maintain operations 14 - - - - -
Funding reimbursement - - 27 - - -
Guidance on health/safety for responding organizations - 84 - - - -
Guidance on health/safety for the public - 98 - - - -
Human remains recovery - - 75 98 63 71
Incident characterizations - - 34 - - -
Incident notification and plan activations - - 70 - - -
Interment respecting religious requirements for most faiths - - 30 - - -
Job action sheets for positions in plan - - 40 - - -
Joint agency death investigations - - 55 - - -
Legal and statutory authority - - 66 - - -
Long-term family management/memorial - - 8 - - -
Mass fatality information systems - - 48 - - -
Mental health services for staff - 81 - - - -
Mental health services for public - 70 - - - -
Missing persons call center - 61 23 - - -
Morgue operations for contaminated remains - - 41 - - -
Morgue services - - 83 - - -
Mortality surveillance and analysis - 74 92 71 63
Notification next of kin - - - 95 66 66
Obtaining additional staff needed to respond - 89 - - - -
Post mortem examination/morgue operations - - 73 - - -
Processing human remains by medical-legal authority - - - 100 63 67
Redundant communication systems for health alerts - 98 - - - -
Refrigerated storage of remains - - 77 - - -
Religious/cultural considerations - - 55 - - -
Security and preservation of disaster site - 49 50 98 54 69
Security and preservation of human remains - 45 70 100 68 77
Sites for interim storage of human remains - 54 - 99 67 66
Staff and suppliers up-to-date contact information 74 - - - - -
Staff respite area - - 30 - - -
Storage of human remains post processing - - - 98 58 60
Temporary interment - - 17 - - -
Tracking system for human remains - 37 57 100 62 65
Training for staff on PPE - 90 - - - -
Transporting remains - - - 96 61 59
Vital records system - - 51 - - -
Written inventory of key supplies 35 - - - - -
Written plans to continue regular service 16 - - - - -
Written plans to provide altered service 12 - - - - -
Written plan on staff absences 14 - - - - -
Average per sector 33 72 52 97 66 69
Average across 3 MFI categories (OEM sector only) - - - 77
aAbbreviations: DCI, death care industry; DOH, department of health; MEC, medical examiners/coroners; OEM, offices of emergency management; PPE, personal
protective equipment.
bHazardous materials.
cA dash indicates the item was not included in the sector’s survey.
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In terms of organizational capability, our investigation found
that these sectors have limited experience to draw upon.
Only about half of our sample reported organizational parti-
cipation in MFI drills; far less reported prior experience with
MFI. We have shown that MFI experience is positively cor-
related with higher levels of preparedness,13 and emergency
response experience is associated with better organizational
performance in general.14
Less than half of the sample reported that their staff had
been trained for MFI, and only about a quarter reported that
staff had been trained for MFI with CBRNE. There is
additional cause for concern when the data on MFI experi-
ence and lack of training are viewed in light of willingness to
respond; the number of experienced staff that are both willing
and able to respond is likely to be suboptimal for
contaminated MFI. These findings are similar to other studies
on intentions to respond to disasters when hazardous
contaminants are involved.13,15-17 Assumptions regarding
response workforce strength may compromise even the best
disaster planning; therefore, data on the expected “true”
response of staff are a critical piece of planning information
for mass fatality infrastructure organizations.7 Most
respondents perceived that their workplace was “somewhat
prepared,” yet almost all respondents reported that more
training, drills, and planning were needed to improve their
level of preparedness, which is a clear mandate for allocating
additional resources to the MFI infrastructure for prepared-
ness activities.
With respect to operational capability, the OEM sector
appears adequately prepared for an uncomplicated MFI,
but considerably less so if the MFI involves CBRNE
contamination. The most dramatic deficits were reported in
the capacity of managing sites and human remains that were
contaminated with CBRNE. The DOH sector reported
TABLE 4
Network Capability: Resource-Sharing Relationships With Selected Response Partnersa
Valid Percent by Response Sector
Survey Item DCI DOH FBO MEC OEM
Valid n 288 177 -c 119 151
Respondent’s organization has reciprocal ties with…
coroner, sheriff, or justice of peace b 62 - 55 51
faith-based organizations - 22 - 24 19
federal assets (eg, DMORT, National Guard, DOD, DOE) - 3 - 55 21
local first response organization (eg, fire, EMS, police) 15 62 - 61 68
local funeral homes, cemeteries, crematories 64 55 - 59 23
local health care organizations (eg, hospitals) - 46 - 48 36
local OEM 9 45 - 70 -
nearby local and/or state DOH 10 59 - 60 50
medical examiner/other medical examinerb 27b 35 - 47 23
state OEM - 43 - 61 -
volunteer organizations (eg, Red Cross, NERT, CERT) 7 33 - 38 31
aAbbreviations: CERT, community emergency response team; DCI, death care industry; DMORT, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response
Team; DOD, Department of Defense; DOE, Department of Energy; DOH, department of health; EMS, emergency medical services; FBO, faith-
based organization; MEC, medical examiners/coroners; NERT, neighborhood emergency response team; OEM, offices of emergency
management.
bIn the DCI questionnaire, the medical examiner category included coroner.
cA dash indicates the item was not included in the sector’s survey.
TABLE 5
Comparison of Density of Ties Between Response Partners Within Each Sector for Resource Sharing Networksa
DCI DOH FBO MEC OEM Average
Valid n 288 177 124 119 151 -
Expect to provide resources 0.58 0.60 0.43 0.55 0.63 0.56
Expect to obtain resources 0.30 0.66 - 0.67 0.44 0.52
Reciprocal (expect to provide and receive resources) 0.22 0.42 - 0.47 0.55 0.42
aAbbreviations: DCI, death care industry; DOH, department of health; FBO, faith-based organization; MEC, medical examiners/coroners; OEM, offices of
emergency management. Density is shown as normalized proportion (0–1).
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unique strengths such as maintaining continuity of its non-
response functions, providing health and safety guidance and
training for other responders and the public, and providing
mental health services. In comparison, the ME/C sector,
designated lead in MFI response, reported only
about half the operational capability to do so. In our survey,
42% of ME/C reported that 24 or fewer additional fatalities
over their normal caseload (in a 48-hour time period) would
exceed their capacity. This suggests a potentially critical gap
in surge capacity. In a recent analysis of a mass murder
incident with 33 deaths, Fierro and colleagues noted that
whereas a relatively small incident (<50 fatalities) can gen-
erally be managed by ME/C without additional out-of-state
resources, even these smaller incidents require local system
surge capacity.18 Other gaps reported by ME/C included their
ability to identify temporary interment, provide staff respite
areas, manage missing person call centers, and communicate
to the public through social media. The ability to provide
interment that was sensitive to a range of religious beliefs was
low. We have no information on the ability of ME/C to
provide other services (such as missing person call centers) for
non-English-speaking populations, as this was not addressed
in our survey (for the ME/C or any other sectors), however,
this is an important issue that deserves closer examination. For
some of the operational capabilities for which the ME/C had
notable gaps (eg, provide staff respite areas, manage missing
person call centers, and communicate to the public through
social media), the DOH sector has reportedly better capacity,
suggesting that the 2 sectors could improve MFI preparedness
by building on synergistic capabilities.19 The DCI sector
reported the lowest operational capability, with the greatest
deficits in formal written aspects of planning for supporting a
response, suggesting that this critical civilian sector is not
effectively included in local preparedness strategies.
Our network results reflect uneven resource-sharing potential.
Although three-quarters of respondents reported that their
organizations had mutual aid agreements in place, less than
half reported reciprocal ties with specific response partners.
When relationships are not reciprocal, a hierarchical
arrangement is more likely, with less peer-to-peer collabora-
tion. During a response, every sector may not require equal
reciprocity, but the existence of reciprocal relationships is an
indicator of collaborative potential.2,20 Gaps were found
between all sectors despite well-documented evidence that
effective response requires collaboration between the
government and the private sector.4,21 Of particular note was
the imbalance in reciprocity reported by governmental sectors
(OEM, DOH, ME/C) versus the DCI sector. That imbalance,
combined with the high density measurement in the DCI
“provide resources” network, suggests that the DCI sector
understands its important role in MFI response, but death
care organizations are not effectively incorporated into the
overall response infrastructure. When collaboration exists
mainly within (rather than across) sectors, a full-spectrum
response that requires extensive on-scene coordination may
be delayed. This delay can result in inefficiencies, additional
costs, increased use of resources, and greater risk to the
responders and the general public.
Our network density measurements suggest that about half
of the possible relationships between response partners in
the MFI infrastructure are likely to be present. Density is
associated with “flow” (eg, of communication, resources,
services) between entities and is correlated with the potential
to coordinate.11,22-24 In general, the expected effect of lower
density is less capability for handling complex situations, such
as multi-sector response.23 For example, effective levels of
density between fire and rescue teams during response have
been demonstrated as being as high as 95%.25 Organizations
with high reciprocal relationships and high capacity to obtain
resources are likely to be better prepared.14,26
Limited capability within sectors diminishes the effectiveness
of the MFI infrastructure as a whole. For example, excellent
operational capability for response to uncomplicated MFI
within the OEM sector and adequate operational capacity in
the ME/C and DOH sectors were offset by weak operational
capacity in the DCI sector, which can provide critically
needed services during an MFI response. The result is a
composite score for preparedness at about half the maximum,
suggesting that an effective and efficient response to a large-
scale or complex MFI is not likely.
The study findings are constrained by several important
limitations. Our purposive convenience sample is not repre-
sentative of all key sectors, both in terms of numbers and
distribution across the country. Any of the 3143 counties and
county equivalents in the United States27 may or may not
have a DOH, OEM, and/or ME/C, and the respondents in our
study represent only a small fraction of these organizations.
More research using extensive, representative samples is
clearly needed. We also limited examination of voluntary
organizations’ preparedness to members of the faith-based
sector, and other organizations, most notably the American
Red Cross, also play crucial voluntary roles. Further
examination of the preparedness of these other voluntary
organizations is warranted in future studies.
Another threat to reliability stemming from the convenience
sample is systematic bias. We have no explanation for the
distribution of responses, or for the higher response rates across
sectors from Texas and the lower response from other states, nor
do we know if this imbalance affected our results. However, we
do know that Texas has shown important leadership in terms of
MFI preparedness.28 Furthermore, our estimates of national
preparedness are based on individuals responding for their
organizations, who may or may not have been the most
knowledgeable about their organization’s MFI capabilities.
Finally, the missing DMORT sector is important to acknowledge
because they bring significant expertise to MFI; however,
anecdotally, it has been reported that they have been
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underfunded and under-resourced for several years. This impor-
tant national asset might be severely compromised in response to
a large-scale MFI involving thousands or more deaths.
Despite these limitations, our study resulted in well-defined
measures of MFI preparedness for this large and critical infra-
structure as well as the only known empirical evidence on
preparedness within and across the 5 response sectors that com-
prise the infrastructure. These findings begin to fill a significant
gap in our knowledge about relationships between organizations
that have essential roles and responsibilities in MFI, with
important implications for national response policy and planning.
CONCLUSIONS
These results provide evidence of a pressing need for a
collaborative MFI response infrastructure that is optimized
through planning, training, and drills across sectors at all
levels.29,30 The variability we found presents a compelling
argument for this enhanced planning so that individual sector
weaknesses can be identified and addressed. This approach is
exemplified in FEMA training courses that focus on colla-
borative planning through simulations.31 Regional planning
is another promising approach for mitigating the economic,
environmental, and psychological consequence of MFI. The
pioneering multi-sector planning underway in New York,
New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania is expected to
maximize regional coordination, communication, and unity
of effort.32
All sectors need clear guidance regarding their MFI respon-
sibilities. Predefined roles can be useful, but the focus should
remain on collaboration, because in a novel response, pre-
defined roles may not apply. The professional organizations
that represent each sector in the mass fatality infrastructure
can provide leadership by developing and distributing gui-
dance, and advocating for local, state, and federal support.
For example, core competencies for MFI response, similar to
those proposed for disaster medicine and public health, are
needed to guide workforce training.33
Finally, in the National Response Framework,5 support for
management of mass fatalities is defined by the Public Health
and Medical Services Annex, Emergency Support Function
(ESF) #8, which is coordinated by the US Department of
Health and Human Services.34 It should be pointed out,
however, that standards for preparedness are not provided in
the National Response Framework for any of the sectors in
the mass fatality infrastructure or for the infrastructure as a
whole. Furthermore, ESF #8 currently has a large scope,
including evacuation and care of the living, and federal
stakeholders may wish to consider whether a dedicated MFI
response function is needed.
We know that preparedness is essential for effective emer-
gency response. The resiliency and recovery of affected
communities and the nation as a whole depends on the
readiness of the government and private sectors to collaborate
efficiently. History, experience, and current trends tell us that
future MFIs are inevitable. Enhanced national preparedness
for MFIs of any scale is crucial for ensuring a response that is
both effective and respectful of the victims and society’s
deeply held values.
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